Israel in Context
Is it possible in the Middle East?
By: Bev Goldman
“Maintaining control over millions of Palestinians without granting them full rights undermines Israel’s democratic character and could lead to international isolation.”
“Perhaps the October 7, 2023, catastrophe will lead to new thinking about peace plans. The Austrian Jewish philosopher Martin Buber considered a binational state in 1946. Palestinian and Israeli thinkers, among them Bashir Bashir, Leila Farsakh, and Avraham Burg, have recently picked up these ideas and considered alternatives to partition. What, they asked, if self-determination for Israelis and Palestinians is not necessarily based on territory but on citizens’ rights? Mediators and peace-seekers must keep their minds open and not give up on a peaceful solution because the alternative is endless war.”
(Tessa Szyszkowitz, Curator, the Bruno Kreisky Forum for International Dialogue, Vienna)
The events of October 7, 2023, marked a significant and traumatic moment for Israel. The attack triggered a massive military response from Israel and led to a renewed focus on its security and regional strategy. Now, Israel must look forward to a future shaped by several critical questions and challenges. The two-state solution remains on the table, if only for the lack of any viable alternative. But for it to be realised, it will require a recognition by Israel that it cannot control Palestinian lives without possibly disastrous consequences and an unacceptable cost, and a renewed commitment by the Palestinians to the idea of peaceful coexistence with Israel.
The idea of a two-state solution as the resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has been championed by many over the decades. It envisions Israel and a sovereign Palestinian state coexisting peacefully side by side. However, despite numerous negotiations, peace talks, and international efforts, this solution appears increasingly unlikely. Among the many reasons for its potential failure are deep-seated historical grievances, irreconcilable differences, and evolving geopolitical realities.
The world, the Middle East, and Israel are now confronting important issues about Israel’s long-term strategy in Gaza. Israel faces the dilemma of how to prevent Hamas from rearming and regaining strength without becoming bogged down in a prolonged occupation or creating a power vacuum that could lead to even greater instability. The options for this include more robust international cooperation, renewed efforts to empower moderate Palestinian factions, which would, of course, need the international community to monitor, and/or investigating the potential of new security arrangements.
A major consideration in all this is, of course, the dynamics relating to Israel’s internal politics. Just before the October 7 massacre, Israeli society was polarised specifically over judicial reforms proposed by Prime Minister Netanyahu’s government. The crisis – the massacre – initially resulted in a sense of national unity, but how likely are these political tensions to resurface once the outside threat subsides, or when the hostages are returned? Israel is facing an inevitable war; Israelis across the country are involved in countless acts of assistance, cooperation, relief, and support for those either directly or indirectly involved in the actual armed conflict. There is the possibility that, given the government’s handling of the crisis and its aftermath, which will be closely investigated, the political landscape of the country will be affected, even Binyamin Netanyahu’s future as Prime Minister and the stability and success of the current coalition government.
Apart from the political, the psychological impact on Israeli society has been profoundly traumatic. Communities near the Gaza border, those hardest hit, will need intense and ongoing therapy, counselling, and support (both emotional and financial). There are numerous families now consisting of mothers (widows) and their children who, having lost husbands and/or fathers, are in need, in pain, and in overwhelming despair. Critical to maintaining societal resilience will be the government’s plans for rebuilding damaged areas, providing support to the victims, and restoring and facilitating a long-term sense of security. How viable that last point will be has yet to be tested.
If there are major shifts in public opinion and the political landscape, leading to increased support for hardline policies on security and less tolerance for perceived threats, all of which would potentially benefit right-wing and security-focused parties, the vision of a two-state solution will inevitably be dead in the water. For such a solution to happen, there needs to be trust, but there is currently no trust on either side, nor is either prepared to compromise because of the lack of trust. How do negotiations take place between parties both of which are resolute in their determination not to give an inch? Israel wishes to protect its land and its citizens; Hamas wishes to reclaim what it demands is its land, but the protection of its citizens is not very high on its wish list. And even if Hamas is “defanged”, finding a viable alternative to the terrorist group that can govern Gaza effectively and peacefully remains a significant challenge. Who then would manage the new Palestinian state?
So, while some may argue that the violence underscores the need for a political solution, others believe it demonstrates the unlikelihood of achieving lasting peace through a two-state framework. Israel may face increasing pressure to consider alternative approaches, though these come with their own set of challenges and risks. And the threats from other hostile actors in the region, including Hezbollah and Iran, cannot be ruled out. Should they show future aggression, Israel will no doubt send a strong message that only overwhelming force will counter this aggression. Yet there are numerous Israelis on the left who believe that maintaining control over millions of Palestinians without granting them full rights undermines Israel’s democratic character and could lead to international isolation.
Israeli society is organised along the principles of democracy and because of that, it can, or certainly should, be able to deal with its flaws. Palestinian society, on the contrary, does not show any tendency toward democracy and a culture of political compromises. As a result, it is also isolated by its potential Arab allies, not because they would be democrats – which they are mostly not – but because, in none of its forms, was Palestinian leadership able to formulate and attract attention and support through such a political culture of compromise.
Israel’s actions post-October 7 have drawn both support and criticism from the international community. While many Western countries, particularly the United States, expressed strong support for Israel’s right to defend itself, the scale of the military response in Gaza has resulted in growing international concerns about civilian casualties and humanitarian conditions. What Israel needs to do is balance her security needs with maintaining international support, particularly from key allies, while addressing global concerns about the humanitarian impact of its actions. In the West Bank, tensions have heightened, and Israeli-Palestinian clashes have increased. This is yet another concern facing Israel: she needs to address the growing instability and violent outbreaks stemming from the hostility towards the settlements, ongoing Israeli military operations, and the unfettered frustration of the Palestinians. The options for dealing with this are either further crackdowns or working towards preventing a larger uprising by addressing some Palestinian grievances. Could the latter be a path towards something more positive, or is that something neither side is prepared to imagine? One wonders.
Iran’s support of Hamas and other militant groups, along with the potential threat from Hezbollah, remains a significant concern for Israel. Some say her regional strategy, that of taking a more aggressive stance against Iranian influence in the region, including potential pre-emptive actions against Hezbollah or Iranian assets, will focus on countering these threats while trying to avoid a broader regional war. Hamas’s initial massacre, the worst attack since the Holocaust, has morphed into a terrifyingly intractable conflict, exacerbated by the involvement of Iran and Hezbollah; and worst of all, negotiations for the release of the hostages have reached an impasse.
Today, a growing number of political analysts believe that whether Hamas is eradicated or not, many Israelis, thinking that they have no choice, could consider empowering the Palestinian Authority since without a functional and self-confident Palestinian entity, there is no alternative to extremism. Again, that speaks to the divisions within Israeli society and even the government; but taken to its extreme, could that be a first step toward reviving the two-state solution?
